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Few concepts in law have been attacked with the ferocity
and tenacity that the judiciary has reserved for disclaimers of
warranty. Even though U.C.C. section 2-316 provides the man-
ner by which parties to a transaction for the sale of goods may
disclaim implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
a particular purpose, courts have held many disclaimers meet-
ing the section's requirements to be unenforceable.' In Wash-
ington State, a combination of judicial and legislative actions
has added to the requirements of the U.C.C., and to warranty
disclaimers not governed by the Code, the additional require-
ments that a disclaimer of implied warranties be explicitly
negotiated and that the attributes being disclaimed be specifi-
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1. See, e.g., Hartwig Farms Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson, 28 Wash. App. 539, 625
P.2d 171 (1981); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346
(1971). But cf. Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 111 Wash. 2d 396, 759 P.2d
418 (1988) (disclaimer contained in auction catalog held valid irrespective of buyer's
ignorance of the clause); Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422
(1986) (disclaimer of warranty of habitability contained in contract for sale of
commercial property upheld when there had been no express negotiation but the
contract was reviewed by the buyers' lawyer). In jurisdictions other than Washington,
courts have invalidated warranty disclaimers as being unconscionable, despite their
compliance with the disclaimer requirements of U.C.C. § 2-316. See, e.g., Martin v.
Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985) (seller failed to inform buyer of
disclaimer and its effects); A. & M. Produce v. F.M.C. Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186
Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982) (seller did not negotiate disclaimer nor inform buyer that it
would).
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cally described.2
The genesis of these requirements was Berg v. Stromme, a
case in which the Washington Supreme Court sustained the
claim that a disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability did not bar a new car buyer from recovering
for a breach because the term had not been "explicitly negoti-
ated" between him and the dealer.3 In Berg, the plaintiff, a
nonmerchant, purchased a new car from the defendant. After
the plaintiff experienced problems with the car, he sued,
claiming a breach of express and implied warranties. The
court found that the plaintiff negotiated with the defendant
the purchase of more than forty pieces of optional equipment,
the cost of which nearly doubled the price of the car. The court
also found, however, that the plaintiff did not negotiate with
the defendant over various terms appearing in condensed type
on the reverse side of the purchase order. One of those terms
was a disclaimer by the defendant of all warranties, express or
implied.4 The court stated that "[w]aivers of such warranties,
being disfavored in law, are ineffectual unless explicitly negoti-
ated between buyer and seller and set forth with particularity
showing the particular qualities and characteristics of fitness
which are being waived."5 Although the Berg decision may
2. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 196, 484 P.2d 380, 386 (1971); WASH. REV.
CODE § 62A.2-316(4) (1989) (WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316 requires only that
disclaimed attributes be set forth with particularity and does not apply to sales by
nonmerchants or to sales to commercial parties).
3. Berg, 79 Wash. 2d at 196, 484 P.2d at 386.
4. The transaction contained two warranty disclaimers: one on the back side of
the purchase order, in type of even size and style, as item three of eleven items, the
second occupying one line of 26 lines that covered half of an entire page in the
conditional sales contract. Id. at 193, 484 P.2d at 385.
The transaction in Berg was governed by the Uniform Sales Act. If it had instead
been governed by the stricter terms of the Uniform Commercial Code, the relevant
provision of which is codified in Washington as WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316 (1989),
the disclaimer probably would have been invalidated for failing to use the word
"merchantability" and for not being conspicuous. As discussed infra text
accompanying notes 28-101, if marginal buyers would notice such disclaimers so that
the disclaimers' existence would affect their purchasing decisions, the size and
placement of the disclaimers would not result in suboptimal terms and should not
affect the disclaimers' enforceability. On the other hand, if the terms were so obscure
or incomprehensible that marginal buyers would not evaluate such terms in making
their purchase decisions, the terms ought not be deemed to have been part of the
transaction on the basis of fraud. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 103 (3rd
ed. 1986). Despite the fact that the disclaimers met the disclosure requirement of
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) by being conspicuous and mentioning merchantability, some courts
have held such disclaimers unconscionable under U.C.C. § 2-302. See, e.g., Martin v.
Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985).
5. Berg, 79 Wash. 2d at 196, 484 P.2d at 386 (emphasis added).
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have provided relief to the bedeviled owner of a 1965 Pontiac,
it also created rules that increase the transaction costs of the
bargaining process to the extent those rules are adhered to by
contracting parties.
To the Washington Supreme Court, the Berg case involved
a paradigmatic unfair transaction in which the contract term
was provided on a standard form without negotiation. The
court assumed that the buyer was unaware of the onerous dis-
claimer clause and that he would never have agreed to it if he
had known of its existence.7 Thus, in the eyes of the court, the
buyer received what economists would classify as a suboptimal
term. The facts that the court recited were apparently
intended to suggest that the seller was unconcerned with the
buyer's preferences and completely unwilling to take those
preferences into account when drafting his form contract.8
The court's dire view of contracts using standardized
terms, if correct, might be perceived by some to justify the
explicit negotiation and particularized disclaimer requirements
of Berg. But if, instead, the terms of those contracts are the
product of determined efforts by merchants to offer the terms
that buyers desire, explicit negotiation and particularized dis-
claimer would simply be unnecessary, unwanted, and costly
protections forced upon buyers by the courts.
In this Article, we will examine the economic forces that
shape the typical contract for the sale of goods to determine
whether Berg's requirements of explicit negotiation and spe-
cific disclosure are justified, and if not, whether the Berg rules
should be modified or abolished. In particular, we will
examine how buyers and sellers determine the terms of the
contracts they enter. Most importantly, we will consider the
common assertion that consumers have no ability to bargain
and therefore have no influence on what terms merchants and
manufacturers include in their standard contracts. We will
also consider whether merchants systematically frustrate con-
sumers' preferences regarding contract terms, or whether,
instead, merchants are driven by market forces to satisfy those
preferences at either competitive or monopolistic prices. We
will conclude by suggesting that the Berg rules are ineffective,
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or at best unnecessary, in furthering the consumer protection
goals announced by the court itself.
II. THE RULES OF BERG AND ITS PROGENY
Courts quickly extended the Berg rules, described above,
to situations other than disclaimers of warranty in consumer
purchases of durable goods.9 In Dobias v. Western Farmers
Association,'° the Court of Appeals invalidated a disclaimer of
warranties because it was not explicitly negotiated, even
though both parties to the contract were merchants, and even
though the party seeking to defeat the disclaimer actually
knew of its presence by virtue of its inclusion in previous con-
tracts between the parties." Apparently unconcerned that the
Berg court's desire to protect against unknowing assent to dis-
claimers had been completely satisfied by the buyer's actual
knowledge of the disclaimer, the Dobias court instead focused
on explicit negotiation, as if the court considered negotiation to
be an indispensable ritual indicating actual assent. 2
The approach in Dobias appears to have been modified
somewhat by Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robin-
son, 3 in which the same court recognized in dicta that dis-
claimers could be effective between merchants if sufficient
evidence were introduced to show that either a course of deal-
ing between the parties or trade usage provided for such dis-
claimers.1 4 Finding insufficient evidence of such a course of
dealing or trade usage, the court went on to invalidate the dis-
9. Although the Berg decision was not explicitly predicated upon the fact that the
party attempting to avoid the disclaimer was a nonmerchant buyer, the Washington
Supreme Court later appeared to so characterize the decision. In Schroeder v. Fageol
Motors, 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975), the court rejected the defendant's attempt
to distinguish Berg on the basis of the plaintiff's status as a merchant. The Schroeder
court stated:
We are fully aware that the rule enunciated in Berg v. Stromme, supra, was
premised predominately on policy grounds. However, this does not support
Fageol's contention that the Berg rule is limited to disclaimer cases involving
innocent consumers as contrasted with purely commercial transactions
involving businessmen .... We now find no persuasive reason why this same
public policy should not extend to cases . . . in which the litigants are both
businessmen.
Id. at 261, 544 P.2d at 24.
10. 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346 (1971).
11. Id. at 200, 491 P.2d at 1350.
12. See id.
13. 28 Wash. App. 539, 625 P.2d 171 (1981).
14. Id. at 547, 625 P.2d at 175-76.
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claimer at issue because it had not been explicitly negotiated. 15
Despite the rapid and enthusiastic expansion of the Berg
doctrine,1" the Washington Supreme Court has recently limited
the doctrine in important ways in cases involving nonconsumer
transactions. In Frickel v. Sunnyside Enterprises,"7 the court
considered the case of an inexperienced buyer who purchased
apartment buildings that later proved to have faulty founda-
tions. The buyer sued the developer/seller, claiming that the
seller had breached an implied warranty that the apartments
would be habitable. The seller defended on the ground that,
among other things, the contract of sale signed by the buyer
included a disclaimer of warranties.
After holding that an implied warranty of habitability did
not attach to the transaction, the court went on to state in
dicta that the seller's disclaimer of warranties was valid even
though the parties did not explicitly negotiate over it.' 8 The
court found the Berg case distinguishable from the case at bar
in several important ways: first, the buyers, though inexperi-
enced, were entering into the purchase of commercial property
as an investment; 19 second, the transaction was at arm's length,
with no hint that it involved what is commonly characterized
as a contract of adhesion;20 and third, the buyers were repre-
sented by counsel and had ample opportunity to inspect the
premises or obtain an expert inspection if they had desired to
do so. 2 Thus, the court concluded, the buyers did not require
15. Id. at 545, 625 P.2d at 174-75.
16. The Washington courts extended a modified version of the explicit negotiation
rules to provisions dealing with limitations of remedy. In Schroeder v. Fageol Motors,
86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975), the Washington Supreme Court considered a
limitation on consequential damages that was contained in a sales contract between
two merchants. The court rejected a per se requirement of explicit negotiation to
validate such limitations of remedy, instead requiring the limitation to be proven
unconscionable under WASH. REV. CODE § 62A2-302 (1989). Schroeder 86 Wash. 2d at
259, 544 P.2d at 23. The court stated that considerations of specific negotiation and
conspicuousness of the limitation of remedy would be relevant to a determination of
unconscionability, although not conclusive. Id. at 260, 544 P.2d at 23. The court also
stated that the course of dealing between the parties and relevant trade practices
would be pertinent as well. Id. The court further noted that, because determinations
of unconscionability can be made only after a full hearing, lack of explicit negotiation
could not be grounds for summary judgment on the issue of the conscionability of a
limitation of remedy. Id. at 262-63, 544 P.2d at 24-25.
17. 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986).
18. Id. at 720, 725 P.2d at 426.
19. Id. at 720, 725 P.2d at 425.
20. Id. at 720, 725 P.2d at 426.
21. Id. at 720, 725 P.2d at 425.
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the protection afforded less capable buyers under Berg.2 2
The next contraction of the explicit negotiation require-
ment came in Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Associa-
tion.23 In Travis, the court dealt with a buyer purchasing a
racehorse at auction on behalf of a partnership of which he
was a member. After purchasing the horse, the buyer discov-
ered that the horse was physically unfit for use as a racehorse.
The former owner of the horse and the auctioneer refused to
refund the purchase price, and the buyer sued both, claiming,
among other things, breach of an implied warranty.24 In their
defense, the seller and auctioneer relied on a disclaimer of
warranties contained in a catalog issued to the buyer. The
buyer responded by asserting that the disclaimer was invalid
under Berg because it was not explicitly negotiated between
the parties. The court sided with the seller and auctioneer and
refused to extend the explicit negotiation doctrine to sales at
auction.25
To support its decision, the Travis court explicitly relied
on some of the same economic rationales explored later in this
Article. The court pointed out that the auction catalog conspic-
uously displayed the disclaimer at issue and that such disclaim-
ers, at least in the context of an auction, were effective even if
the buyer did not have actual knowledge of them.26 This rule
was necessary, the court explained, to preserve the fundamen-
tal justification for auctions: "[P]art of the economic rationale
of an auction is to avoid face-to-face negotiations. It is a cost-
saving device in which face-to-face negotiations, except as to
price, are not engaged in by the parties."
27
The explicit negotiation doctrine thus appears to be devel-
oping away from the rigid and overinclusive rules of Berg and
its progeny, moving instead toward the more refined form sug-
gested by Frickel and Travis. In the section that follows, we
analyze the economic considerations alluded to in these latter
two cases.
22. Id. at 721, 725 P.2d at 426.
23. 111 Wash. 2d 396, 759 P.2d 418 (1988).
24. The court's conclusion, albeit apparently in dictum, was that the auctioneer, as
"seller" of the horse, was a merchant and thereby made the implied warranty of
merchantability under U.C.C. § 2-314. This conclusion is highly questionable since the
auctioneer did not have title to the horse but acted only as agent for the owner. See
Survey: Uniform Commercial Code, 44 Bus. LAW. 1439, 1457-58 (1989).
25. Travis, 111 Wash. 2d at 403, 759 P.2d at 422.
26. Id. at 403, 759 P.2d at 421.
27. Id. at 403-04. 759 P.2d at 422.
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III. THE ECONOMIC ISSUES
A. Introduction
Intervention into a market in the form of statutes or com-
mon law rules mandating28 or prohibiting29 contract terms
must rest on at least an implicit conclusion that the market in
which the term appears is not° functioning properly.3" This
proposition seems self-evident, since the terms generated by
the market should be corrected only if the market is
malfunctioning.
Market failure caused by imperfect information is clearly
the policy basis for the decision in Berg. The court argued that
the typography of the form contract presented to the buyer
was so difficult to read that buyers were unable to discover
from reading it that they were agreeing to a disclaimer of war-
ranties.3 ' The court also argued that a disclaimer of implied
warranties was so far contrary to the typical expectations of a
buyer who had, in the same transaction, negotiated several
express warranties, that assent to such a disclaimer must be
presumed to be unknowing.32
But the issue of market failure is as difficult to resolve as
it is easy to raise, and the court made no effort to overcome
that difficulty through rigorous analysis of the economic prin-
28. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988) [hereinafter Magnuson-Moss Act].
29. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Act, supra note 28, at § 2308(a) (limiting disclaimers
of implied warranties with respect to consumer goods for which a written warranty is
provided); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639(a) (1983) (disclaimers of implied warranty are
void ab initio; statute imposes civil penalties and attorney's fees for including a
disclaimer of implied warranties in a contract); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316 (5)
(Supp. 1988) (disclaimers of implied warranties and limitations of remedy for breach
thereof are void and a violation of the state's consumer protection act); MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (Supp. 1988) (oral or written disclaimers of implied warranties are
unenforceable); W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-107 (1986) (a consumer may not waive or agree
to forego warranty rights or benefits).
30. For the purposes of this Article, a "properly functioning" market is one that
achieves the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency. Under the Kaldor-Hicks definition,
a particular redistribution of resources is deemed efficient if that redistribution results
in an increase in the wealth of those who receive the resources that is equal to or
greater than the decrease in wealth of those from whom the resources are transferred.
R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 12-13. Factors that inhibit the attainment of such
efficiency include imperfect information, high transaction costs, and externalities. Id.
at 15-17.
31. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 190-94, 484 P.2d 380, 383-85 (1971); see R.
POSNER, supra note 4 (indicating that contract language may be so obscure or
incomprehensible that it should be unenforceable on the ground of fraud).
32. Berg, 79 Wash. 2d at 193-95, 484 P.2d at 385-86.
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ciples implicated by its decision. Moreover, once it becomes
reasonably clear that a market has failed, a remedy for that
failure must be fashioned that is at once effective and yet mini-
mally intrusive; otherwise, overregulation and inefficiency will
result.33 In the section that follows, we examine some current
theories about how markets function and fail. We then
examine the rules of Berg and its progeny, as well as the rules'
probable applications, to determine whether the markets Berg
is intended to regulate really malfunction and, if so, whether
the remedies provided by the Berg rules are sufficiently effec-
tive and precise to avoid suboptimal regulation.
B. How Markets Function
Unfortunately, empirical research regarding the actual
functioning and malfunctioning of the market for warranties
and other contract terms is scarce. 34 Nevertheless, basic eco-
nomic theory provides an analytical framework that, except
for a minor extension that will be explained later, is sufficient
to indicate whether a given market has failed and therefore
needs judicial regulation.
Basic economic theory is founded on the postulate that
markets consist of buyers, who demand and pay for products,
and sellers, who produce and sell those products to buyers,
with individuals in each group striving to maximize their net
personal wealth. According to this postulate, and according to
commonly observed reality, sellers are in the business of sell-
ing in order to make as much net income as possible, and will
pursue any strategy that will increase their net income. The
seller's challenge is to discover what products buyers want to
purchase and to provide them at a price that will not only
cover the seller's costs of producing and selling the goods, but
will also afford him the highest possible return on his invest-
ment.35 If any seller fails to estimate the desires of buyers cor-
rectly, an incentive will immediately be created for other
sellers to enter the market and capture the additional sales
33. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 343-46. Often, the causes and cures of market
failure present such intractable problems that the market itself, though
malfunctioning, provides a better solution than that which could be devised by the
judiciary or the legislature.
34. Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information and the Market for Contract Terms.
The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1393 (1983).
35. See generally Jenner, An Information Version of Pure Competition, 1966
ECON. J. 786, 791.
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that the first seller could have made had his estimate of buy-
ers' preferences been more accurate. Observation again shows
that such seller misestimation does in fact take place, probably
inevitably so.36 Although sellers can and do gather informa-
tion regarding consumer preferences through surveys and
other methods, it is highly unlikely that such information is
complete, and trial and error appear necessary to supplement
such information. Consumers reliably reveal their prefer-
ences only after they are actually offered new goods, and many
times only after they have purchased them. In this area, the
seller proposes and the consumer disposes. 39
The seller's task of determining consumer preferences cor-
rectly, providing a product to satisfy those preferences, and
establishing an appropriate price is complex. As a group, buy-
ers place differing subjective values on any given good. These
values tend to range from high above the seller's cost of pro-
duction to far below that cost. In essence, the seller's task is to
offer one price that will induce as many of these buyers as
possible to buy, despite their differing values, while at the
same time leaving the seller with the highest possible return
on invested capital and compensation for taking an
entrepreneurial risk.
With competition among sellers, the seller can accomplish
these objectives only by offering a price equal to his total cost
of selling the good, including a normal profit.4 ' By offering
36. Id. at 797.
37. Id. at 794.
38. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION 246 (3rd ed. 1983). See
Smith & Swinyard, Information Response Models: An Integrated Approach, 82 J.
MARKETING 81 (Winter 1982) (suggesting that consumers purchase many goods for
trial purposes and make committed decisions to such goods only after trial).
39. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 246.
40. The seller need not offer only one price. Instead, the seller could offer a
different price to every nonshopping buyer by individually bargaining over price. By
pricing goods through individual negotiation, the seller would be able to charge all
nonshopping buyers an amount somewhere between the competitive price and the
buyers' reservation price. The seller would thereby capture some "consumer surplus,"
which is the amount of value the nonmarginal buyer places on the good over and
above the value placed on the good by the marginal buyer. So long as the seller does
not charge buyers more than their respective reservation prices, the seller will lose no
sales, even though he is charging a higher price. Thus, the seller's return on
investment increases. However, individual negotiation over price is usually too
expensive a method of pricesetting to justify the increase in net return it .would
generate.
41. Again, in a competitive market, the seller's price must be high enough to
compensate the seller for his investment of capital and for taking an entrepreneurial
risk.
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such a price, the seller induces purchases by all buyers to the
left of the intersection of the supply and demand curves (Q.)Y
Figure 1 illustrates the supply and demand curves in a compet-
itive market. Although the seller will make no sales to those
buyers to the right of Q., he loses no profit, since to sell to buy-
ers to the right of Q. would require him to sell his goods for
less than they cost to produce, resulting in reduced net income.
The seller need not concentrate his efforts on those buyers far
to the left of Q., since they will buy at any price less than their
reservation price, which is represented by the demand curve.
Rather, the seller must focus on those buyers who will not buy
unless he offers his goods at a price relatively close to the
seller's marginal cost of production. The people in this latter
group, on the margin of the market, are called marginal
buyers.
To attract these marginal buyers, a seller must ascertain
what attributes his product must possess before marginal buy-
ers will purchase them. Product attributes in a given market
42. The intersection of the supply and demand curves represents the market
equilibrium. However, in reality, markets are rarely at equilibrium for long, if at all.
See Jenner, supra note 35, at 797 (noting that once equilibrium is reached, sellers
search for new products to exploit); see also Whitford, Law and the Consumer
Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1006, 1013-
14 n.15 (describing rapid fluctuations in the scope of automobile warranties offered by
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler). Changing economic conditions, buyer
preferences, improved seller and buyer information, and technological innovation can
each distort markets. The fact that markets are constantly changing implies that
assessment of how well a particular market is functioning must be an ongoing process.
Thus, judicial conclusions regarding market function based on casual observation at
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may be numerous and varied. For example, in the new car
market, some dealers may offer cars with big engines; other
dealers will offer cars with small engines. In addition, the
terms under which the goods are sold, including the price,
must all be considered as part of the bundle of goods conveyed
to the buyer. Thus, the presence or absence of a warranty, the
length of time required for delivery, the quality of post-sale
repairs, and every other imaginable attribute of the sales trans-
action must be considered an integral part of the goods offered
for sale and become criteria for attracting marginal buyers and
for competition among sellers.43
A product's total cost to the buyer includes, among other
items, both the amount of money he pays to the seller and the
amount of utility the buyer sacrifices if he buys a good having
attributes that he regards as suboptimal. The existence of this
latter cost provides an incentive for marginal buyers to com-
pare the attributes of various sellers to reduce the risk of mak-
ing a suboptimal purchase. If enough marginal buyers
compare the attributes of goods offered by different sellers in
the market, all sellers must conform the attributes of their
goods, including price, to those demanded by marginal buyers.
Sellers who refuse to compete across all attributes risk losing
sales to competing sellers.
C Market Failure
From the foregoing material, it can be seen that in a per-
fectly competitive and perfectly informed market, competition
among sellers will cause them to conform their goods as closely
as is cost-justified to the preferences of the greatest possible
number of buyers. But this conclusion will not, in itself,
resolve the issue of whether the market will function in the
same way once the assumptions of perfect competition and per-
fect information are relaxed to reflect some, or perhaps most,
markets as they actually exist.
1. Monopoly
To relax the first assumption, that of perfect competition,
we will analyze how contract terms are generated in less than
perfectly competitive markets. Because most courts and legal
43. For ease of reference, we will refer to all of these attributes of the transaction,
whether they relate to the good itself or to any of the literally hundreds of other
aspects of the sales transaction, as simply "attributes."
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commentators tend to equate imperfect competition with
monopoly, we restrict our analysis to that phenomenon. It
should be noted, however, that an attack on the premise that
markets will generate optimal contract terms can just as easily
be based on a number of other potentially anticompetitive phe-
nomena. 44 First, we show that sellers probably will continue to
offer optimal contract terms even when a monopoly exists.
Then, we explain why markets dominated by monopolists will
probably continue to generate optimal terms even if most buy-
ers in that market are less than perfectly informed about the
goods they are buying and about the terms upon which they
are buying them.
A monopoly exists when a single producer controls the
supply and price of a given commodity, so that buyers have no
alternative source of the good and therefore must pay the price
demanded by the monopolist or forego having the commodity
that is so controlled.4 5
44. Such anticompetitive phenomena include oligopolies, cartels, and markets
manipulated by dominant firms. Although monopolies and oligopolies differ in many
ways, these differences do not affect our analysis to any significant degree. Unless
otherwise indicated, our analysis of imperfect competition under monopolistic
conditions applies with equal force to situations involving oligopolistic conditions.
45. Oligopolists who explicitly collude with one another are called a "cartel."
EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION, supra note 38, at 263. For the purposes of our discussion,
the distinction between oligopolies and cartels is irrelevant, and both will be referred
to as "oligopolies."
It should be noted that the likelihood of establishing a stable oligopoly is
decreased substantially by the costs of negotiating and policing an agreement to not
compete openly. These costs are increased by the nature of the oligopoly itself. Each
member of the oligopoly will have an incentive to cheat, thus requiring all members to
take steps to monitor the production of all other members. The easiest form of
cheating, and the most difficult to control, is for producers to decrease elements of the
buyer's total cost other than monetary price by, for example, improving the quality of
their products, their delivery or warranty services, or other product attributes not
normally regulated by an anticompetitive agreement.
It is important at this point to distinguish between markets that are dominated by
a few producers because of collusive behavior and markets that have reached that
stage through normal processes of market competition and specialization. The cause of
market domination is important in the context of Berg, since market domination by
monopolists is popularly believed to foster abuse by sellers in various ways.
Market domination, as the end result of successful competition, is most likely to
occur if economies of scale and high initial capital costs discourage producers from
entering the market while rewarding large companies that produce efficiently on a
large scale by allowing them to grow even larger. These firms then tend to dominate
the market and squeeze out smaller, less competitive firms. Thus, domination of an
industry by a few firms need not necessarily be the result of oligopolistic collusion. A
good example of failing to make this distinction appears in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), in which the court assumed that, simply
because the American car market was at one time dominated by three large
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Monopolies generally are perceived as undesirable for var-
ious reasons, some of which are more well-founded than
others. One negative effect of monopolies, usually raised by
economists, is that a monopoly will result in sellers producing
less of the good and buyers having to pay more than they
would have to pay if the market were competitive. Further-
more, although monopolists are better off charging monopoly
prices, their welfare gains do not offset the losses suffered by
buyers. This situation results in a net societal loss. 46 Monopo-
lies also create, as illustrated in Figure 2, what has been called
a "deadweight loss." By artificially raising the cost of goods
sold by charging monopoly prices, monopoly sellers induce
buyers to substitute goods that are more costly to produce than
the monopoly goods, but that sell for a price below the monop-
oly price.4 ' The increased cost resulting from the substitution
of more costly goods is the deadweight loss, that is, a cost with
no offsetting benefit.
A more frequent, but less supportable theory, is that a
monopolist will take advantage of his dominance of the market
by degrading the quality of terms offered in the contracts
under which he sells. 48 This theory of attribute degradation
through the exploitation of monopoly power by sellers in a
concentrated market does not, however, appear to be correct.
A monopolist, or a seller in a concentrated market, will gain
companies, an oligopoly must have existed. Id. at 358, 161 A.2d at 87. The Henningsen
court, after citing the high degree of centralization in the American car market in the
late 1950s, stated: "There is no competition [i.e., there is an oligopoly] among the car
makers in the area of express warranty." Rather than being the result of collusion, it
is likely that the similarity of warranty terms observed by the court was the result of a
temporary convergence of market-driven terms. The high degree of centralization of
the new car market at that time was quite possibly the result of normal market forces
driving smaller producers, such as Kaiser and Studebaker, out of the market while
sustaining big producers such as Ford and General Motors. These big American
producers have since encountered serious competition by major foreign automobile
producers who have marketed their cars worldwide in order to take advantage of
international demand. These foreign producers were then able to accomplish some of
the same economies of scale as had the large American companies, and thus are able to
effectively compete in the American market.
Interestingly, although market domination by a few firms may not be a reliable
indicator of oligopoly control of a market, such domination nevertheless makes
oligopolistic collusion more likely by lowering the cost of policing a collusive
agreement. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 267.
46. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 155.
47. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 254-55.
48. See Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297,
1299-1300 (1981) (describing the "exploitation theory" in relation to the content of
consumer product warranties).
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more by providing preferred terms to the greatest extent possi-
ble-while charging supracompetitive prices for those terms-
than he would by selling on terms that are less desirable to
buyers.49 The seller's goal is, after all, to sell the most product
he can at any given price, and he can achieve maximum sales
only by offering the best product at the price, be it a monopoly
price or a competitive price.50 Not only is it theoretically
unlikely that monopolists or sellers in a highly concentrated
market will offer inferior terms, other than price, but what lit-
tle empirical evidence exists also suggests that monopolists do
not engage in such behavior.5 '
Moreover, to the extent that a monopolist fails to supply
the attributes desired by buyers, and to the extent that those
attributes can be provided by suppliers other than the monopo-
list at prices lower than those demanded by the monopolist, an
incentive will be created for new producers to enter the mar-
ket and profit by filling any unsatisfied purchaser demand.
Market entry by other producers will force the monopolist to
lower his price, improve his product, or both. Common exam-
ples of competition from aftermarket producers include
independent insurance companies that offer warranties on new
and used cars, as well as merchants of automobile accessories
such as radios, fog lights, tinted windows, and custom paint
49. Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework, 17 J.L. & ECON. 493, 494
(1974).
50. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 102.
51. See Priest, supra note 48, at 1324-25.
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jobs. Competition from aftermarket sellers such as these will
cause even monopolists to offer products with attributes
desired by the marginal buyers, and will tend to limit the
extent to which monopolists can charge supracompetitive
prices for those attributes.52
Even when a monopoly exists, however, judicial interven-
tion is unlikely to improve the buyer's position. Trebilcock5 3
has argued that when a particular contract term is banned on
the ground that one of the parties to the agreement is a
monopolist who has overpowered the other party through
superior bargaining power, the cost to the monopolist of fore-
going the banned term will be passed on by the monopolist to
the buyer by an adjustment of other terms not directly regu-
lated. Thus, Trebilcock argues, a monopolist who is con-
strained as to one particular term in his contract will simply
degrade other contract terms in order to achieve the same mar-
ginal cost of production and, therefore, the same net return.5 4
Trebilcock concludes that any attempt to regulate monopoly
power in a market must be comprehensive, since to attempt
regulation of any lesser scope is "like squeezing putty. '55
Thus, according to Trebilcock's analysis, a monopolist under
rules like those of Berg will obey a judicial requirement of
explicit negotiation and particular disclosure, but will degrade
other product attributes such as warranty service, product
quality in excess of that necessary to make the product merely
merchantable, or delivery. Unless a court that imposes such
mandatory terms can demonstrate that it can effectively con-
trol all attributes of the sale transaction, there can be no assur-
ance that sellers will not simply recover the cost of complying
with the mandated term by degrading other terms, leaving
consumers no better off.
2. Imperfect Information
Up to this point, we have assumed that buyers are per-
fectly informed about all aspects and attributes of the products
52. It might be possible for a monopolist to charge somewhat higher prices if he
had a comparative advantage over aftermarket sellers in producing the attribute in
question. In that case, a monopolist would charge a price higher than his marginal cost
of production but low enough to prevent market entry by aftermarket producers.
53. Trebilcock & Dewees, Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts, in THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE LAW 93 (P. Burrows & C. Veljanovski eds. 1981).
54. Id. at 104.
55. Id.
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they purchase. This perfect knowledge allows them to choose
from among the various products, sellers, and terms of sale,
and ensures that their choices will attain for them the highest
degree of satisfaction possible. Opponents of economic analysis
have rightly attacked this assumption as being unrealistic.'
Even though the assumption may be unrealistic, it does not fol-
low that the theory that the market will provide optimal terms
will be incorrect.57
a. Marginal Buyers and Market Discipline by Competition
Many opponents of the theory that markets will generate
optimal product attributes and contract terms implicitly
assume that all buyers in a given market must be perfectly
informed in order for them to realize maximum satisfaction, or
"utility," from their purchases. Such an assumption is mis-
taken, however, because it ignores the crucial function served
by marginal buyers.
Because most sellers sell standard goods at prices deter-
mined without individual negotiation, sellers must make sure
that the goods they sell have the attributes and prices desired
by buyers at the margin, as already explained. Since these
goods and prices will be standard, all buyers, whether well
informed or not, will benefit from the information that margi-
nal buyers have used when evaluating the products offered by
different sellers. Thus, although only marginal buyers may be
well informed, the attributes and prices offered by sellers will
be the same as if all buyers were well informed.
An important qualification of the power of marginal buy-
ers to discipline markets and to obtain optimal terms is that
such buyers be sufficiently numerous to exert enough influ-
ence on the seller to induce the seller to modify the terms on
which goods are offered. Schwartz and Wilde indicate that if
too few marginal buyers comparison shop, sellers will be able
to maximize profit without actively trying to sell to marginal
56. For example, the assertion that consumers are inadequately informed about
the products they buy is a cornerstone of the theory of strict products liability. See
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960) (car buyers
were alleged to be unable to evaluate risk of serious injury caused by defective
automobiles).
57. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in 3
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953). Friedman points out that disproving the
assumption underlying a theory does not negate the predictive value of the theory.
Predictive value can be determined by testing the theory.
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buyers.5
According to Schwartz and Wilde, there are two types of
buyers: shoppers and nonshoppers.59 A shopper is defined as a
buyer who visits more than one seller and who will buy from
the seller who offers the product attributes that the buyer
most prefers at the lowest price, so long as that price is below
that shopper's reservation price.60 A nonshopper, on the other
hand, is a buyer who visits only one seller and will buy from
that seller if the price that seller offers is below that buyer's
reservation price for the product attributes offered.6 1
In order to satisfy the preferences of shoppers and non-
shoppers, a seller will likely offer the product attributes that
buyers prefer, charge the absolute lowest possible price, which
is the price at which the seller's marginal revenue equals his
marginal cost, and sell to all purchasers who visit him.62 The
seller will sell to all potential buyers a product with the attrib-
utes buyers prefer and at the lowest possible price.63 The
seller will do this because, if he does not, other sellers will
have an incentive to offer the goods with attributes buyers pre-
fer or at a slightly lower price in order to attract shoppers
away from the seller with the less preferable attributes or
higher price." Thus, for products that lack attributes buyers
prefer or that sell at any price above the minimum competitive
price, a seller will make no sales to shoppers, and therefore
will be able to sell only to nonshoppers.6 5 A seller who sells
only to nonshoppers will then raise his price to some point
between the competitive price and the nonshoppers' reserva-
tion prices and might provide attributes different from those
that buyers prefer, since the seller will lose no further custom-
ers by doing so. 66 Sellers will pursue this strategy, however,
only if they will make more profit selling only to nonshoppers
at their reservation prices and with attributes different from
those that buyers prefer than they would if they sold to both
shoppers and nonshoppers with the attributes preferred by
58. Schwartz and Wilde, supra note 34, at 1449-52.
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buyers at the competitive minimum price. 67 Sellers will usu-
ally be better off selling solely to nonshoppers only if very few
consumers comparison shop.68
Several commentators, including Trebilcock and Dewees,69
and Farber7 ° have objected to the theory that the marginal
buyer obtains optimal terms for all buyers. They object on the
ground that the terms and prices designed to appeal to the
marginal buyer are not necessarily optimal for the typical
buyer.7 ' For example, Farber contends that marginal buyers
who expend resources to seek out sellers offering good warran-
ties may be less cautious in preventing product failure than
would the typical buyer (for example, by failing to provide rou-
tine maintenance), or may be less inclined to seek insurance
against product-caused losses from other sources.72 This asser-
tion, however, appears ill-founded.
It is true that some nonmarginal buyers-and, it should be
noted, some marginal buyers-may not prefer some of the
attributes of the entire bundle of attributes offered by the
seller. The buyer's dislike of some attributes of the bundle
offered by a seller does not, however, mean the bundle as a
whole is suboptimal for him. The buyer's decision to buy the
goods offered by the market, in spite of the fact that he does
not prefer some of the particular attributes of the goods,
manifests that he values this imperfect bundle, as measured by
his willingness to pay for it, as much or more than the price he
must pay to obtain it. In essence, the buyer has demonstrated
by his purchase that he considers himself to be better off with
the goods, imperfect though they may be, than he would have
been without them.
The buyer's purchase, however, does not necessarily indi-
cate that the market could not provide him with the attributes
he prefers more. Any disharmony between the attributes pre-
ferred by a given segment of buyers in a market and the attrib-
utes actually offered in the market creates an incentive for a
67. Id.
68. Id. Schwartz and Wilde extend their analysis to include the comparative
advantage of sellers in selling with and without warranties. Id. at 1409-12. The impact
of the seller's comparative advantage appears to be sufficiently limited so as not to
affect the basic analysis of this Article.
69. See Trebilcock & Dewees, supra note 53, at 93, 108.
70. Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 303,
333 (1983).
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Trebilcock & Dewees, supra note 53, at 93, 110, 117).
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seller to adapt the attributes of the goods sold to please those
buyers currently not satisfied by the attributes offered in the
market. If any seller can increase his net return or gain by
adapting the attributes of the goods to please nonmarginal buy-
ers, he will do so, and market segmentation will occur.
If no seller can increase his net return or gain by changing
the attributes of the goods, he will offer only that bundle of
attributes that attracts the marginal buyers. This result indi-
cates nothing more remarkable than that the ability of any
given market to satisfy every buyer is constrained by external
factors, such as technology, scarcity of inputs, or high transac-
tion costs, that make it inefficient to satisfy each buyer's indi-
vidual preferences. In the end, although some buyers are
unable to obtain exactly the package of attributes they desire,
the utility of all buyers, including the somewhat disgruntled
buyer, is maximized. Thus, there can be no objection to the
fact that the preferences of the nonmarginal buyers may
diverge somewhat from those of marginal buyers.
A question does exist regarding whether or not adverse
selection or moral hazard will inhibit or prevent sellers from
offering warranties of merchantability or fitness so that a com-
petitive market cannot be expected to generate optimal war-
ranty terms. In the context of the extension of warranties,
adverse selection occurs when a person knows he can obtain
greater gains from warranty protection than the average buyer
and has information superior to that of the seller concerning
his increased consumption of warranty protection. For exam-
ple, if a seller warrants a washing machine motor for one year,
expecting that the machine will be used by buyers once or
twice a week to do household laundry, the owner of a laundro-
mat where the machine will be used twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week has an incentive to purchase the machine to
obtain greater benefits than the average purchaser from the
warranty protection.73 Sellers have, however, means to protect
themselves against adverse selection while still offering the
warranty protection demanded by the market. In the example
above, they can include provisions that exclude coverage for
commercial or other extraordinary uses."4
73. Priest, supra note 48, at 1317; see Bishop, The Contract Tort Boundary and the
Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 246 (1983); R. RUFFIN & P. GREGORY,
PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 271 (2d ed. 1985).
74. Priest, supra note 48. at 1317.
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With respect to the warranty of merchantability, some of
the risk of adverse selection is mitigated by the character of
the warranty itself. In contracts for the sale of goods, U.C.C.
section 2-314(2)(c) provides that the goods must be fit for the
"ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." In the
washing machine example posed above, in which the machine
was designed for household use, one might maintain that com-
mercial use is outside the ordinary purpose of the machine and
is, therefore, not covered by the warranty. The indeterminate
character of warranties of merchantability, 5 however, presents
a substantial risk that a person engaging in adverse selection
will be able to convince a trier of fact that his use of the prod-
uct, although somewhat extraordinary in character, still falls
within the scope of the product's somewhat nebulous ordinary
use.
With respect to the implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose, the risk of adverse selection is very low since
the warranty will only arise if the seller has reason to know of
the particular purpose for which the buyer is procuring the
item. Thus, the rules establishing the conditions under which
the warranty will exist provide for the communication of infor-
mation that will minimize or eliminate the risk of adverse
selection.76
As Priest indicates, a seller facing an adverse selection
risk, such as that hypothesized with respect to the washing
machine, may modify the product's attributes to force the per-
son with the extraordinary use to purchase a machine more
suitable to his use.77 Moreover, the seller may modify the
terms of the implied warranty to exclude extraordinary uses,
such as commercial ones, to shorten the terms of the warranty,
or to offer more than one set of warranty terms. 8 Thus,
adverse selection does not appear to be a substantial impedi-
ment to the offering of implied warranties if buyers demand
them.
Moral hazard may occur in a warranty context when a
75. See infra text accompanying notes 114-16.
76. Cf. Bishop, supra note 73, at 254-60 (maintaining that the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), requiring a promisee to divulge information about
any extraordinary loss he might suffer as a result of breach in order to recover for
such loss, mitigates the adverse selection problem by promisees who would suffer
extraordinary loss).
77. Priest, supra note 48, at 1318.
78. Id. at 1347.
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person fails to take cost-effective measures to assure that a loss
does not occur because the warranty fully insures him against
the loss. The person's behavior will result in greater consump-
tion of the warranty's insurance than is optimal. When a seller
warrants that a product will be merchantable or fit for its ordi-
nary purpose for a certain period of time, a buyer may have an
incentive not to make socially optimal investments of his own
to assure that the good does not become unfit because the war-
ranty protects against the cost of that risk. To eliminate moral
hazard problems, sellers may require buyers to make appropri-
ate investments in care, such as performance of routine main-
tenance as a precondition of warranty coverage. Additionally,
sellers may exclude from coverage instances in which there
has been product misuse79 or sellers may even force the buyer
to bear some of the cost of warranty service, for example, by
requiring a buyer to return the product to the seller for war-
ranty work. Moreover, any uncompensated loss the buyer may
suffer if the product fails gives the buyer an incentive to avoid
such failure.8 0 Moral hazard does not appear, therefore, to be a
significant barrier to the provision of implied warranties.
Before we can conclude that the buying behavior of margi-
nal buyers will generate optimal warranty terms, several ques-
tions pertaining to the competency and impact of such
behavior remain to be addressed. In particular, it must be
established that it is probable that marginal buyers are suffi-
ciently well-informed about the effects of warranty disclaimers
and the probability and cost of product failure to provide
appropriate incentives for sellers to offer optimal warranty
terms.
If marginal buyers do not understand the legal effect of
warranty disclaimers, they may demand suboptimal warranty
terms.8' An underestimation of a disclaimer's effect will result
in an excessive demand for such a term, while an overestima-
tion will produce insufficient demand for a disclaimer.
79. See Bishop, supra note 73, at 264.
80. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 34, at 1445-46.
81. The question of whether it is reasonable to assume that marginal buyers
whose decision to purchase is affected by the content of warranty terms know of the
existence of warranty disclaimers is not addressed in the text. If marginal buyers are
unaware of such disclaimers, they cannot be assumed to be able to demand optimal
disclaimer terms. Since these buyers will not purchase a product unless they receive
the warranty terms they prefer, it is reasonable to believe that they are familiar with
the content of warranty provisions in contracts, including disclaimer provisions.
How such buyers know of the existence of disclaimers is less important than
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The proposition that marginal buyers probably either
understand or overestimate the effect of warranty disclaimers
is supported by several factors. Some disclaimers contain lan-
guage such as "as is" that is commonly perceived as meaning
that the seller makes no commitment as to the quality of the
product sold. 2 Since language of this sort is frequently used in
connection with the sale of used products for which no war-
ranty is given, it is reasonable to believe that many buyers, and
certainly marginal buyers, will comprehend the significance of
such language.
For other disclaimer terms, such as, "merchantability," it
is commonly assumed that buyers do not comprehend the con-
cept of such terms. However, marginal buyers whose purchas-
ing behavior is affected by the content of warranty terms
whether they know, but the manners in which such information is obtained can be
explained.
First, with the exception of transactions in consumer goods as to which § 2308(a)
of the Magnuson-Moss Act precludes modifications or disclaimers of implied
warranties, warranty disclaimers are ubiquitous in contract documents. Moreover, in
sales of goods governed by U.C.C. § 2-316, written disclaimers of implied warranties
must be conspicuous, that is, they must be noticeable to a reasonable person. U.C.C.
§ 1-201(10).
Second, at least marginal buyers are likely to become aware of contract terms,
such as warranty disclaimers, because these terms will likely affect the buyer's welfare
during the performance of the contract in which the term appears or in similar
contracts with which the buyer has had previous experience. From common
experience, it is plausible to assume that most people pay little attention at the time of
purchase to the terms of a disclaimer of liability appearing on the back of a form
contract. Nevertheless, it is still likely that they enter into transactions subject to such
terms with relative frequency. It is credible to assume that such buyers occasionally
examine the terms of at least one of these contracts over the course of numerous
transactions. For instance, a buyer may encounter a problem with a product and
examine the product's warranty to determine the character and extent of the coverage.
If the buyer is unable or unwilling to examine the warranty, he may simply demand
that the seller repair the product. The seller's subsequent acceptance or rejection of
the buyer's request will then inform the buyer of the de facto warranty terms. Thus, a
buyer entering into form contracts should be able to get a good idea of the typical
terms appearing in such contracts and can use his knowledge of those terms as a basis
for decisions regarding subsequent similar purchases. Although the buyer may be
ignorant of the terms of a particular contract, his knowledge of the typical terms
appearing in similar contracts into which he has previously entered should be adequate
to allow him to infer the terms of the contract into which he is presently entering.
82. The notion that "as is" has this common connotation is supported by the
Federal Trade Commission Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule, 16 C.F.R.
§ 455.2(a)(1) and (2) (1989), which requires a used car dealer to display a sticker on an
automobile indicating whether it is a no warranty or warranty transaction. To indicate
that it is a no warranty transaction, the form must provide a box followed by the terms
"as is-no warranty." Although the additional qualification "no warranty" is added to
the term "as is," the use of the latter clearly indicates its significance to members of
the purchasing public accustomed to buying used goods.
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probably do comprehend the concept since its effect may sig-
nificantly affect the value of a warranty to them. Therefore,
they have an incentive to engage in a cost-effective search to
ascertain the effect of a disclaimer containing that term. More-
over, even if it is assumed that insufficient incentives exist to
investigate the precise effects of such a disclaimer, marginal
buyers would probably assume the worst possible warranty
coverage consistent with the information provided, that is, that
there is no warranty whatsoever.8 3 If, in fact, the disclaimer
had a less drastic effect, the buyer would assume the seller
would say so, since doing so would increase the value of the
transaction to the buyer and result in increased sales and reve-
nue to the seller.8 4
If a buyer decides to purchase a product despite his incor-
rect assumption that a disclaimer is broader than it really is, he
will have obtained the good he desires on terms that are at
least minimally acceptable to him. He simply will have erred
on the side of purchasing more protection than he otherwise
would have if he were better informed. The incorrect assump-
tion is certainly inefficient in the sense that it will cause buy-
ers to overestimate the total cost of goods they buy, thereby
causing them to consume a suboptimal amount of goods. How-
ever, buyers will have purchased more warranty protection
than they would have preferred, not less, and can hardly be
said to have been victimized by their ignorance in any exploi-
tive sense.8"
Finally, at least some marginal buyers will become famil-
iar with the effects of warranty disclaimers because such dis-
claimers will affect the buyers' welfare in some of the
transactions in which disclaimers are used. Over time, buyers
enter into numerous transactions where warranty disclaimers
are involved. During the performance of some of these transac-
tions, problems with the items sold are likely to occur. If a
buyer is unaware of the effect of a disclaimer when entering
into a transaction, he will probably learn its effect when he
seeks relief from the seller. From this and similar experiences,
83. Cf. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure
About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 465-466 (1981) (explaining that consumers
rationally expect a seller's quality to be the poorest possible consistent with his
disclosure).
84. Id.
85. See Priest, supra note 48, at 1304 (research of numerous warranty disclaimers
indicates similarities in the kinds of attributes found in such disclaimers).
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the buyer will obtain information about the legal effect of dis-
claimers and will store this information for use in future trans-
actions since it will assist in assessing the value of those
transactions and in minimizing the risk of making a purchase
with suboptimal terms.
If marginal buyers inaccurately estimate the probabilities
that products will fail, they will demand and sellers will pro-
vide suboptimal warranty terms. If such buyers overestimate
the probability of product failure, they will demand excessive
warranty protection; if they underestimate such probability,
they will demand insufficient warranty coverage.
Although equally serious from an efficiency perspective,
overestimating the probability of product failure is probably
considered less serious with respect to warranty protection
than underestimation. As previously noted with respect to a
purchaser's "worst case" assumption about the meaning of
"merchantability, '86 the consumer will have purchased more
warranty protection than he would have if accurately
informed. Purchasing more warranty protection will raise the
price of the good more than is optimal, and the buyer will con-
sume less of the good than if he were accurately informed.
8 7
The prospect of this underconsumption provides an incentive
for sellers to provide more accurate information about product
failure to cure excessive pessimism. Sellers may also engage in
activities such as advertising to signal buyers about the quality
of their products.88 Moreover, an incentive exists for third-
party sources of information, such as Consumer Reports and
specialty journals and magazines, to provide accurate informa-
tion to protect buyers from excessive expenditure on warranty
protection. 9
86. See supra text accompanying notes 83 and 84.
87. To some extent purchasing more warranty protection than is optimal will
increase problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. A purchaser of a washing
machine, for example, may exercise less care in maintaining the appliance if she now
perceives that the product's failure will be covered by the warranty. See Priest, supra
note 48, at 1349.
88. See Kein and Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 630 (1981) (indicating that sufficient investment in
advertising by a firm implies that the firm will not engage in short-term quality
deception since the cost of advertising is a sunk cost that can only be recouped through
future quasi-rents, the existence of which depend on current product quality).
89. See Auto Service Contracts: Don't Buy One When Your Car Is Brand New.
And Think Twice About Buying One At All, CONSUMER REP. 663 (Oct. 1986) (advising
new car buyers to purchase an extended warranty or service contract only for cars
having a high frequency of repair as indicated in the organization's survey of car
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To some, the more serious potential error in estimating
product failure is the underestimation of such failure that
results in consumers demanding too little warranty protection.
Some evidence supports the proposition that buyers lack the
information processing ability in some instances to assess the
need for appropriate product attributes or contract terms. For
example, some analysts contend that people, in this instance
buyers, ignore or underestimate the likelihood of the occur-
rence of low-probability events.9 A buyer may, for example,
underestimate the probability of a beverage bottle exploding.
As indicated above, if the buyer underestimates or ignores such
a risk, he will demand, and sellers will provide, less product
safety than the buyer needs and would demand if the buyer's
perception of the risk of injury were accurate.
Assuming as accurate the proposition that people are inca-
pable of evaluating accurately or do not perceive the risk of
low-probability events, we believe there are limiting circum-
stances that preclude that phenomenon from being a serious
issue with respect to product deficiencies ordinarily encom-
passed by the warranties of merchantability and fitness.9'
First, as Schwartz and Wilde point out, people's tendency to
underestimate or ignore low-probability events may be a func-
tion of the "availability heuristic."92 Although people underes-
timate the occurrence of some low-probability events, they
either assess accurately or overestimate the occurrence of
purchasers); 1987 Buying Guide Issue, CONSUMER REP. 55 (Dec. 1986)
(recommendation against purchasing extra rust-proofing given the extent of
manufacturer rust-proofing of new cars and warranties against rust perforation).
90. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
91. Liability for personal injury resulting from defective products is dealt with
under products liability law in torts and is no longer subject to contract and sales law
except in cases in which the injured person may find greater protection under a
warranty. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.010-.060 (1989) (providing for liability of
manufacturers and sellers of injury-producing products including manufacturer
liability for products that are not reasonably safe because they fail to conform to
implied warranties).
92. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 34, at 1441. The availability heuristic is a rule of
thumb used to gauge the frequency or probability of an event's occurrence. The
heuristic is based on the ease with which instances of the occurrence are brought to
mind. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127-28 (1974). Availability is affected by several biases that may
lead to erroneous judgments. For example, when determining the size of a class, a
person may judge a class whose members are more easily remembered as more
numerous than a class whose members are more difficult to remember although the
size of the two classes is the same.
1990]
262 University of Puget Sound Law Review
others.93 To the extent Schwartz and Wilde's contention is cor-
rect, buyers may overestimate the likelihood of some product
defects occurring, such as automobiles undergoing sudden
acceleration, because such events receive significant publicity.
Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that some, perhaps
most, problems with goods and services are not infrequent,
low-probability events. In one survey of consumers who had
purchased various goods and services, the consumers voiced
non-price problems with 32% of automobile purchases, with
26% of vacuum cleaner purchases, and with 28% of clothing
purchases. 94 The authors of this study concluded that their
data supported "the conventional belief that consumers suffer
frequent problems with purchases."9  Finally, if product
defects ordinarily were low-probability events, underestimated
by buyers, one would not expect to see the existing level of
seller activity in providing and fulfilling express warranties
with respect to such defects.96
In addition to the failure to recognize or to correctly esti-
mate the occurrence of low-probability events, marginal buyers
may also underestimate the probability of product failure
because of insufficient information about such failure or
because they gather such information from inadequate sources.
Evidence indicates that people tend to use information that is
readily available and understandable when making a decision
and that such information may inaccurately represent the
93. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 34, at 1441.
94. Best & Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey
of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 701, 705 (1977). For a similar study, see Ross & Littlefield, Complaint as a
Problem-Solving Mechanism, 12 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 199 (1978) (dissatisfaction cited in
19% of television and washing machine purchases).
95. Best & Andreasen, supra note 94, at 706. The occurrence of problems is not
necessarily indicative of sellers' attempts to provide products of appropriate quality but
of their attempts, perhaps somewhat imperfectly, to do so cost effectively.
96. We are thankful to Bruce Mann for this observation. The above discussion
does not mean that there are not low-probability product defects the existence of
which buyers may ignore or underestimate. Rather, it indicates that the range of such
defects may be quite limited based both on the frequency with which buyers do
perceive product defects and the interrelationship of the availability heuristic with the
underestimation phenomenon. It cautions against an overgeneralization that a market
probably has failed because the problem manifested had a low probability of
occurrence. Such a generalization would probably cause courts to invalidate warranty
disclaimers too frequently, causing excessive and suboptimal warranty protection.
Judicial or other legal intervention to preclude disclaimers dictated by the market
ought only be undertaken when the decisionmaker is assured that the risk was not
only one of low probability but also that the market failed to provide the correct
warranty. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 34, at 1441-42.
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whole of available information.97 For example, a buyer may
talk to two product owners who have not experienced product
failure and come to the conclusion that the probability of fail-
ure is quite low, whereas a more accurate and larger sample
would indicate a higher probability. The dependence on avail-
able information is unlikely to result in marginal buyers as a
whole underestimating product failure probabilities since there
are likely to be buyers who obtain excessively negative infor-
mation, so that the information in the market is likely to be
accurate concerning the probabilities of product failure. More-
over, buyers should be able to make somewhat accurate esti-
mations of probable product failure from prior use with a prior
or comparable model of the same product or experience with
other similar products.
Although such experience may not provide entirely accu-
rate information about failure probabilities for the particular
product, it should apprise the buyer of the potential existence
of such problems that will, to the extent it is perceived to be
cost-effective, stimulate the buyer to seek accurate information
about potential problems with the good from other sources.
Even without such prior experience, buyers of expensive,
infrequently purchased products that present high potential
for loss if defective have an incentive to reduce the risk of loss
by seeking information from unbiased sources such as Con-
sumer Reports and other highly specialized sources of
information.98
With respect to moderately priced, infrequently purchased
items that do not present the risk of substantial loss if defec-
tive, such as an iron or toaster, the value of such a search may
not be sufficiently high, and the potential for underestimating
product risk is more likely. But even with respect to these
products, those which have significant defects will cause their
purchasers to enter the market more frequently to acquire
replacements. From their prior experience, these buyers will
have better information concerning the probability of product
failure. Moreover, if the benefit to individual buyers is too
small to justify an information search, and yet, to purchasers
of the product as a whole the benefit is sufficiently significant
97. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 92, at 1127-28.
98. For a formal proof of the search activity of these buyers, see Schwartz &
Wilde, supra note 34, at 1432. See Kiel and Layton, Dimensions of Consumer
Information Seeking Behavior, 18 J. MARK RES. 233, 237 (1981) (positive correlation
between product price and amount of search).
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to justify a search, an incentive will exist for a third party to
acquire and sell the information.
Finally, although an expected diminution in sales gives a
seller little incentive' to give correct information about the
probability of a defect if consumers underestimate its exist-
ence, a seller does have an incentive to inform buyers, at least
by implication, of deficiencies in competitors' products. For
example, an appliance manufacturer who sells a washing
machine with greater reliability, durability, or longevity has an
incentive either to compare his product directly with that of
other manufacturers or to state or imply that competitor prod-
ucts are inferior with respect to these attributes. Such behav-
ior may not -ive entirely accurate information about product
attributes of competitors but at least provides some informa-
tion from which consumers can proceed to acquire more accu-
rate information.
In addition to knowing the probability of product failure, a
buyer must have an accurate perception of the cost that will be
incurred if such a failure does occur. The reason such knowl-
edge must exist is that it affects the value any warranty may
provide. Such value is important because warranties are costly
to provide, service, and enforce. It is unreasonable to assume
that buyers would be willing to pay for a warranty that pro-
tects against the occurrence of a relatively high-probability
defect, the cost of which is less than the cost of making and
enforcing the warranty. The consumer would prefer to buy
the product without warranty protection at a lower price.
Here again, buyers may obtain substantially accurate estima-
tions of the potential cost of product defects from the use of
the same or similar products. Even if a buyer has purchased a
newer model of a product, he may extrapolate fairly well the
cost of repair from his use of a prior model. Thus, an automo-
bile buyer who previously has incurred the cost of repairing a
failed transmission may, with information about current labor
costs, form a fairly good idea of the cost of repairing a new
transmission in a similar automobile. Indeed, knowledge of the
increasingly more costly and complex nature of many products
may lead buyers to overestimate rather than underestimate
99. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 34, at 1429-30, point out that there is an
incentive to provide accurate information to avoid disgruntled customers and the loss
of good will. As they indicate, however, it probably is better for the seller to provide
the same warranty coverage but bury its cost in the product's overall price.
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defect costs. Some buyers may underestimate the cost while
others overestimate it. As long as the estimation as a whole is
accurate, however, any individual misestimation would be
irrelevant to providing an optimal term. Moreover, sellers who
offer extended warranties or service contracts may be expected
to provide information protecting buyers against the risk of
underestimating repair costs.1"' Finally, as in the situations
mentioned above, at least with respect to defects in expensive,
infrequently purchased products, one would expect informa-
tion about at least the magnitude of defect costs to be available
from third-party sources.10'
D. Summary of Economic Principles
Thus far, we have described the fundamental economic
concepts that we will later use to analyze the rationales relied
upon by the Berg court to justify its ruling. By examining the
interrelationship of those concepts, we have come to some
basic conclusions: First, competitive markets will provide con-
sumers with products that have optimal attributes, under con-
tractual terms that allocate risks in an optimal manner, and at
a price that will attract as many buyers as possible while still
allowing the seller a reasonable return on his investment.
Second, perfect competition is not necessary to assure that
products and contractual terms offered by sellers will be opti-
mal. Even under conditions of imperfect competition, such as
monopoly, sellers will have an incentive to conform their prod-
ucts and terms to those desired by the greatest number of buy-
ers, except that the incentive to keep prices at the competitive
equilibrium will be weaker, and, therefore, prices will be
higher than they would be under conditions of perfect competi-
100. See R.C.A. extended service contract information warning that the labor
portion of unwarranted repairs can be expensive (on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review).
101. See 1989 Buying Guide Issue, CONSUMER REP., which includes estimated
repair costs for used automobiles based on surveys of its readers. The report presents
the survey results with respect to frequency of repairs for 1982-87 model cars. It also
indicates the average repair costs for 1982-86 models and the extent to which a
particular model deviates from the average. Although this information pertains to used
cars, it provides a basis for estimating the repair costs of new models. There would
appear to be little risk that a buyer reading the survey would underestimate the
frequency or cost of repair for a new car, the previous models of which were much
worse than average in these categories. It is more probable the buyer would assume a
"worst case" scenario with respect to such costs absent strong, credible evidence to the
contrary.
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tion. The amount of goods produced under monopoly condi-
tions will also be lower than under competitive conditions.
Third, only a relatively small percentage of buyers need to
comparison shop to motivate sellers to offer goods preferred by
the greatest number of buyers on terms those buyers find opti-
mal. Although reliance on the decisions of such buyers
requires that they be reasonably well informed as discussed
above, buyers are likely to be able to obtain the necessary
information by reading the contract, by inspecting and using
the goods, by obtaining information from third parties such as
friends and consumer magazines, and through repeat
purchases of similar goods. This information is likely to be
enhanced further by sellers of above average quality goods,
who will have an incentive to indicate that the quality of their
goods is above that of their competitors, and by the negative
inferences drawn by buyers from the failure of some sellers to
make such claims.
With these conclusions, it is appropriate at this point to
examine the economic validity of the rationales used by the
courts applying Berg to justify the requirement that disclaim-
ers of warranty be specifically negotiated and that those dis-
claimers set forth with particularity the attributes being
disclaimed.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BERG RULES
A. Perceived Market Failures
1. Buyers' Imperfect Information
Among the rationales used to support the requirements in
Berg that disclaimers of implied warranties be individually
negotiated, and that the attributes being disclaimed be
described with particularity, is the claim that such rules are
needed to ensure that buyers are aware of the terms of the
contracts they sign and have assented to those terms.° 2The
102. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 193-95, 484 P.2d 380, 385-86 (1971). The
court implied that a disclaimer of warranties in a contract for the purchase of a new
car is strong evidence that the buyer never intended to agree to the terms of the
contract. The facts of Berg itself tend to negate this assertion. The plaintiff in Berg
was a psychiatrist of presumably higher than average intelligence who had previously
purchased cars from the same dealer. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the
plaintiff had notice or actual knowledge of the terms appearing in contracts covering
later purchases from the same seller. Signing the contract under these circumstances
can be seen only as an act of assent.
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principal error of this justification is that it overestimates the
importance of any given buyer reading a contract. As pointed
out earlier, 10 3 only a relatively small number of buyers need to
read form contracts in order to influence sellers to provide
contract terms appealing to the greatest number of buyers.
Thus, buyers who do not invest resources to negotiate disclaim-
ers specifically or to discover every particular attribute being
disclaimed can rely on buyers who do take such steps to choose
the most optimal products and terms possible. Complete infor-
mation on the part of all buyers, or even most buyers, is there-
fore not a necessary condition of a properly functioning
market. Thus, the Berg court's rationalization of specific nego-
tiation on that ground must fail.
Furthermore, requiring every buyer to explicitly negotiate
over disclaimers contained in contracts fails to recognize that
buyers will refuse to read contract terms or negotiate over
them only when they have concluded that the marginal benefit
of doing so does not justify the marginal cost.10 4 Most buyers
probably recognize that they could improve their understand-
ing of the terms of the contracts they enter by reading the con-
tract themselves or by consulting persons better able to
evaluate the contract, such as better-informed friends or an
attorney. The fact that many buyers see fit to sign contracts
without obtaining help from others, or many times without
even reading the contract, most likely is explained by their
conclusion that the cost of such measures is greater than the
expected benefits of undertaking them. Thus, those buyers
who would otherwise refuse to negotiate over disclaimers
because of their conclusion that they would be no better off by
doing so are forced by the Berg rule to undertake those proce-
dures anyway. Because these buyers are forced to spend
103. See supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
104. In Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986), the
court held that buyers of commercial property were bound by a disclaimer appearing
in the contract, partly because they were represented by an attorney and partly
because they failed to protect themselves by hiring an expert to inspect the property
for defects. Id. at 721-22, 725 P.2d at 426. It seems highly unlikely that the court
would have required the plaintiffs to hire such experts if the transaction had involved
a less expensive item, such as a used automobile. Such a difference in treatment can
be explained only by a recognition that buyers are responsible for investing resources
to determine contract terms and product attributes up to the point at which it is no
longer cost effective to do so. The same rationale would permit disclaimers to be
effective even if the buyer has determined that it is not cost effective for him to
investigate the terms of the contract or the precise nature of the particular attributes
being disclaimed.
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resources negotiating when they would rather not, they are
unable to spend those resources in other ways that they must
value more highly. To force them to engage in such negotia-
tion is inefficient and makes both buyers and society as a
whole worse off than they would be if buyers were able to
choose whether to negotiate over disclaimers.
Moreover, although it is possible that some buyers may
have no idea that disclaimers of warranty exist, such ignorance
is both unlikely and irrelevant from a conventional contracts
perspective. Complete ignorance of disclaimers is unlikely
because disclaimers are used pervasively except in transactions
governed by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and in jurisdic-
tions that prohibit disclaimers at least in some transactions. °5
Thus it is unlikely that a buyer would not expect to find a dis-
claimer in a contract he was about to sign. Furthermore, as
pointed out above, only a relatively small minority of buyers
needs to be informed about the terms of a contract to ensure
that sellers have adequate incentives to offer those terms that
are desired by the greatest number of buyers.
Ignorance of the terms of a contract is also irrelevant in
determining whether a party has assented to a contfact, so long
as the buyer has reason to know that he is entering into a con-
tract and the seller is not engaged in an attempt to defraud the
buyer."°6 Several years after Berg was decided, the Washington
Supreme Court stated that "the whole panoply of contract law
rests on the principle that one is bound by the contract which
he voluntarily and knowingly signs."' 7 Indeed, were this not
the rule, it would be difficult to see how a person who could
105. The number of contracts in which disclaimers appear is undoubtedly lessened
by § 2308 of the Magnuson-Moss Act, supra note 28, which prohibits a seller of
consumer goods from disclaiming implied warranties when the seller makes an
express warranty of the kind defined by the Act. To the extent that § 2308(a) of the
Act reduces the number of disclaimers of implied warranties, buyers are deprived of
an opportunity to learn about them through experience, contributing to consumer
ignorance of disclaimers--a result contrary to the purposes of the Act as stated in
§ 2302(a).
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1980). Subsection 3
provides that a term in a writing does not become part of the agreement if one party
has reason to believe that the other party would not manifest assent to the agreement
if he knew the writing contained the particular term. This provision ordinarily ought
not apply to disclaimers of implied warranties since the historical existence of
disclaimers in markets over an extended period of time would lead sellers to believe
that buyers would assent to transactions even if the buyers knew of the existence of
such terms in the particular writings involved.
107. National Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886, 912-13, 506 P.2d
20, 36 (1973) (dictum).
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not read or understand the language in which a contract was
written could ever be bound by it.'08
Although the Berg individual negotiation rule succeeds at
increasing buyers' awareness of disclaimers, albeit to an ineffi-
cient level, the rule does little, if anything, to accomplish
another of its implied purposes, which is to ensure that the
buyer has an opportunity to negotiate with the seller over the
terms that the buyer might consider suboptimal. Individual
buyers, like individual sellers, are very unlikely to be able to
negotiate terms other than those regarded as optimal by most
buyers and sellers. Instead, sellers will offer to contract only
on the terms contained in their standard contract-terms that
they have previously determined to be most nearly optimal.
Any buyer attempting to vary the terms of these standard con-
tracts will most likely be rebuffed by the seller, who will pre-
fer to deal with another buyer." 9 Thus, even if a buyer were
to gain knowledge of a disclaimer by virtue of specific negotia-
tion, it is highly unlikely, especially in cases of goods sold
under standard form contracts, that the buyer will be able to
negotiate a different term. The buyer will simply be left with
a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer.1 0
Second, even if mandatory negotiation over terms were
optimal, it is probable that the parties to a transaction would
not negotiate concerning the disclaimer of part or all of the
implied warranties, since the marginal costs of simply negotiat-
ing a lower price while leaving the standard form disclaimer
intact would be cheaper than negotiating and drafting limita-
108. For a case indicating that contracts are binding without regard to whether the
signer is able to read, see Cohen v. Santoianni, 330 Mass. 187, 192, 112 N.E.2d 267, 271
(1953) (dictum). The signer need not even be able to read the language in which the
contract is written. Secoulsky v. Oceanic Steam Navigation, 223 Mass. 465, 112 N.E. 151
(1916); cf. Comment, Plain English Contracts: The Demise of Legalese?, 30 BAYLOR L.
REV. 765, 777-79 (1978) (advocating adoption of a law to require Spanish copies of
English contracts to be given to buyers upon request); see also Calamari, Duty to
Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341, 341-49 (1974).
109. The inability of the individual buyer to affect the terms offered by sellers in
the market is analogous to the economic phenomenon of sellers who are "price
takers." Price takers are sellers who offer their goods in markets in which there are a
large number of sellers offering identical goods. If any of the sellers attempts to raise
his price above the price set by the market, that seller will lose all sales to any other
sellers offering their goods at the market price. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra
note 38, at 205.
110. Of course, the buyer faced with a suboptimal contract term will consider the
extent to which the presence of that term in the contract reduces the value of the good
to him when deciding at what price he will buy.
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tions on the warranty disclaimer.?" Even if the buyer believed
it to be optimal to obtain greater warranty coverage than pro-
vided with the standard form disclaimer, it would probably be
cheaper for the seller to provide an express warranty for the
desired coverage than to carve exceptions from the standard
form document with the costs of employing persons competent
to draft such exceptions or the attendant risks of allowing
unqualified persons to do so.
Even if we were to accept the premise that buyers in
uncompetitive markets are forced to accept terms that they
consider suboptimal, it is difficult to see how explicit negotia-
tion or particular disclosure of the attributes disclaimed would
help buyers. According to the premise just stated, buyers in
monopoly-controlled markets are unable to negotiate success-
fully with the seller. Thus, requiring explicit negotiation
would lead only to the monopolist offering his terms and the
buyer either taking them or leaving them.
The Berg court also supported its requirement of explicit
negotiation by emphasizing the irony of a seller's contract that
contains both express warranties and disclaimers of any
responsibility for assuring that the subject goods will be fit for
their ordinary purpose.11 2 Although this argument has some
appeal, upon careful scrutiny it appears to have several
problems.
First, the argument confuses two separate issues. The
Berg court, for example, assumed that no buyer would contract
for the purchase of a car with express warranties while at the
same time implicitly negating his deal by agreeing to a dis-
claimer of the warranty of merchantability." 3 This argument
fails to consider that accepting a disclaimer of merchantability
is perfectly consistent with a transaction in which an express
warranty is given, and in which the, buyer, although expecting
to receive a car of merchantable quality, nevertheless is willing
to forego a legal remedy against the seller if the car in fact
turns out to be unmerchantable. A seller may, for example, be
willing to warrant that a product possesses a particular attri-
bute without warranting that the product will attain a certain
level of performance.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 125-27 (discussing further the costs of
disclaiming individual attributes of the merchantability warranty).
112. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 193, 484 P.2d 380, 385 (1971).
113. Id.
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Moreover, as Priest points out,1 1 4 the legal standard for
determining whether an implied warranty of merchantability
has been breached is inherently indeterminate. It is therefore
costly to establish whether the warranty has in fact been
breached. Furthermore, since determinations of what "mer-
chantable" means in a given situation are usually made by
juries, there is a significant possibility of error costs. 1 1 5 Differ-
ent juries will reach different conclusions about the scope of
the warranty of merchantability under similar facts, thereby
making it difficult for sellers to estimate correctly their likeli-
hood of success in any given suit for breach of the warranty.
These factors combine to make performing, policing, and
enforcing an implied warranty of merchantability relatively
expensive, and thus present a legitimate explanation for dis-
claimers of the implied warranty of merchantability." 6
Second, the argument that no buyer would voluntarily dis-
claim a warranty of merchantability mistakenly assumes that
such legal sanctions are the only means buyers have of insur-
ing that they receive a merchantable product. Sellers are sub-
ject to competition from other sellers, not only for current
purchases, but also for purchases to take place in the future.
Thus, sellers have an inherent incentive to provide good prod-
ucts to buyers, despite the lack of any legally enforceable rem-
edy on behalf of the buyer if they fail to do so.1 7  The
disciplining effects of these competitive forces are extremely
well illustrated by the facts of the Berg case itself. In Berg, the
defendant car dealer attempted to repair the plaintiff's car sev-
eral times,"" although the dealer was under no obligation to do
so according to the explicit terms of its contract with the
buyer. Such activity can be explained logically only by the
seller's desire to retain the goodwill of the buyer and of those
persons whose future purchases the buyer may be able to
influence.
114. Priest, supra note 48, at 1344-45.
115. Id.
116. See Calfree & Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965-67 (1984).
117. See Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16
J.L. & ECON. 67, 73 (1973); see also Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons". Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 448, 499-500 (detailing
customer retaliation against brand-name goods when those goods have proven faulty
before).
118. Berg v. Stromme, 1 Wash. App. at 917, 465 P.2d at 182 (1970) (the appellate
court indicated that the dealer worked on the car for a total of over 45 days).
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B. Berg as Applied to Parties with Knowledge of a
Disclaimer
Although the Washington Supreme Court may be unwill-
ing to follow them,119 the courts of appeal have held in a dis-
turbing number of cases that disclaimers are ineffective against
commercial parties who had actual knowledge of the existence
of those disclaimers on the ground that they were not explic-
itly negotiated. Such decisions are obviously unnecessary to
further Berg's goals of assuring that buyers have notice of dis-
claimers and truly assent to them, since the buyers in those
cases were merchants who knew of the disclaimers, who had
bargaining power apparently equal to that of the seller, and
who clearly assented to the disclaimers by signing the con-
tracts containing the clauses.
The Washington Supreme Court has recently indicated
that it may be unwilling to allow the expansion of Berg to
include cases in which a party invoking Berg to resist the dis-
claimer had knowledge or notice of the term. In Travis v.
Washington Horsebreeders Association,1 20 the court refused to
strike down a disclaimer even though it had not been specifi-
cally negotiated. The court pointed out that the disclaimer was
contained in an auction catalog, was clear and conspicuous,
and, in a radical departure from Berg, stated that the dis-
claimer was binding upon the buyer regardless of whether the
buyer had even seen it, let alone negotiated with the seller
over it. Central to the court's reasoning was its recognition
that buyers and sellers would voluntarily choose to adopt such
a rule over one requiring specific negotiation of terms in order
to reduce their transaction costs.' 21 Although the court distin-
guished the Travis case from Berg on the ground that Travis
involved an auction, the transaction costs reducing rationale
used by the court to support Travis applies with equal force to
any transaction in which the parties desire to reduce the costs
of entering contracts by using nonnegotiable standard terms.
119. See Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 111 Wash. 2d 396, 759 P.2d
418 (1988) (refusing to strike disclaimer contained in auction catalog); Frickel v.
Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986) (refusing to strike disclaimer
contained in contract for sale of commercial property even though not explicitly
negotiated).
120. 111 Wash. 2d 396, 759 P.2d 418 (1988).
121. Id. at 403-04, 759 P.2d at 422.
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C. Other Economic Ramifications of Berg
Although the economic principles laid out above indicate
that the rationales relied upon by the Berg court to support its
ruling are of questionable merit, there are other economic
ramifications of the Berg rules with which the courts have not
dealt. In this section, we examine some of those ramifications.
One effect of the Berg rules that has not been discussed by
the courts is the rules' tendency to limit buyers' choices. Dif-
ferent buyers have different preferences regarding the total
package of product attributes that they receive when they
purchase a good. These attributes include such factors as the
quality of the good itself, the warranty and return privileges
offered in the seller's contract, and the pleasantness of the sur-
roundings in which the transaction takes place. To the extent
that sellers can increase their net return by adjusting the
attributes of the sale of a given good to satisfy the peculiar
wants of various subgroups within a market, they will do so.
This adjustment by sellers will cause market segmentation,
ranging in degree from subtle to radical. Thus, some sellers
offer relatively poor quality goods with no warranty out of the
back of a truck, while other sellers offer high quality goods
with a guarantee of complete satisfaction in stores with plush
decor.
The Berg rules artificially narrow buyers' choices by
restricting the variety of conditions under which sales of goods
can be made. Under Berg, no buyer desiring to forego tedious
negotiations of disclaimers or a discussion of each attribute dis-
claimed can find a seller who is able to legally include a dis-
claimer in the contract without those rituals. Berg imposes
mandatory bargaining and disclosure upon buyers who would
rather not pay for the privilege. To the extent that buyers'
demand for a product is elastic and sensitive to the added cost
of forced negotiation,122 demand for the seller's product will
drop, causing the resources he otherwise would have used to
produce more of his product to be used less efficiently in other
endeavors. 23 Even if the buyers' demand is not sensitive to
122. Those readers who might scoff at the idea that buyers' demand for a product
would be sensitive to the added costs of specific negotiation and particular disclosure
should ask themselves whether they would not be less willing to buy a very low-priced
item if they had to specifically negotiate with the seller a disclaimer of warranty and
then listen to the seller's particular disclosure of the attributes being disclaimed.
123. The desirability of buyer's choice is not absolute. For example, products that
impose significant externalities upon society, such as highly polluting cars, might
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the added costs of specific negotiation and particular disclo-
sure, the Berg rules nevertheless impose transaction costs that
the parties would rather expend in other, more productive
ways, and thus impose a net welfare loss on society.
124
For example, buyers and sellers are prohibited from agree-
ing to disclaim implied warranties of fitness and of
merchantability unless the disclaimer "set[s] forth with partic-
ularity the ... particular qualities and characteristics of fitness
which are being waived.' 1 25 A buyer and seller who wish to
disclaim the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose or of merchantability cannot, therefore, rely on a simple
statement that unequivocally and clearly expresses that intent,
as do the phrases "as is" or "with all faults," which are allowed
by statute in the case of sales of nonconsumer goods.
126
Instead, both the buyer and seller must expend resources to
disclose and to discuss the precise attributes of the warranty of
merchantability that are to be disclaimed, which in the case of
a blanket disclaimer are all attributes. Since an all-encompass-
ing, individually negotiated (as opposed to standard-form) dis-
claimer is highly impracticable, if not economically infeasible,
the likely result is that sellers and buyers will disclaim
merchantability only as to those attributes that are the most
costly to warrant, and will' leave the seller responsible for the
merchantability of all other attributes. In the long run, the
market will most likely compensate the seller for the expense
of warranting these attributes by passing most of the cost on to
the buyer in the form of a higher price for the good, or less
quality, or similar degradation of nonwarranty attributes. 27
The result is that buyers are forced to consume a suboptimally
high amount of warranty protection, raising the cost of the
good above the price they would prefer to pay, and would be
able to pay, but for Berg's requirement of particularity. Fur-
thermore, this higher price will decrease demand, thereby
causing buyers to consume less of the good. Given buyers'
preferences, this result is suboptimal.
present a legitimate need for regulation that would prohibit selling those goods, thus
depriving buyers of some degree of choice.
124. This loss is analogous to the deadweight loss caused by monopoly. See supra
text accompanying notes 45-47.
125. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 196, 484 P.2d 380, 386 (1971); WASH. REV.
CODE § 62A.2-316(2) (1989).
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316(3)(a) (1989).
127. Trebilcock & Dewees, supra note 53, at 102-04.
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Parties contracting under the Berg rules have another
option: they can simply ignore the rules' requirements of spe-
cific negotiation and particular disclosure if they can do so cost
effectively. 128  If buyers and sellers chose to disregard the
requirements of Berg, sellers would be vulnerable to claims
based upon the implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability, since the disclaimers they would include in
their form contracts would be invalid under the Berg rules, and
therefore unenforceable.129 Sellers would simply take the cost
of such claims into account when determining their price, and
to the extent possible, would pass that cost along to buyers.1 30
Cross-subsidization is another problem created by the Berg
rules that has gone unnoticed by the courts. In the context of
sales transactions, cross-subsidization occurs when a seller
128. It is likely that sellers and buyers do, in fact, tend to ignore the Berg rules.
Although both authors have lived in Washington for substantial periods of time and
have entered into contracts containing disclaimers of the implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability, neither has ever dealt with a seller who has attempted to comply
with the requirements of Berg. However, one of the authors, Ferrell, successfully
invoked the Berg rules to defeat the disclaimer defense of a merchant with whom he
was involved in a dispute.
129. The implied warranty might be successfully disclaimed, however, if a seller
could establish a course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade that
evidenced the parties' intent that no implied warranties attach. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 62A.2-316(3)(c) (1989). Applying the Berg rules to invalidate an otherwise effective
disclaimer under § 62A.2-316(3)(c) appears to be directly contrary to that statute and,
therefore, would be unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. If buyers and sellers were allowed to disclaim implied warranties through a
course of dealing or performance, the cross-subsidization created by the Berg rules
would be reduced or eliminated.
130. The seller's cost (and therefore the price he must charge to buyers) is also
increased by the expected cost of claims based on breaches of the warranties of
merchantability and fitness connected with attributes that either the seller forgot to
include in his particular disclosure or whose particular disclosure he cannot later
prove.
Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, 43 Wash. App. 208, 716 P.2d 911 (1986), presents a
good example of the difficulties created by the particularity requirement of Berg. In
Thomas, the buyer of a car initialed a disclaimer that stated, "I understand that you
don't provide any warranties whatsoever, and the auto is sold as is and with all
defects." Id. at 210, 716 P.2d at 913. The buyer was told by the seller's salesman that
the provision would protect the seller from warranty claims for engine problems
caused by abusive driving. Id. The buyer brought an action for rescission of the
contract and, in preparation for trial, discovered that the car had been wrecked and
that the frame of the car had been inadequately repaired. Id. at 211, 716 P.2d at 913.
The buyer pleaded breach of the warranty of merchantability, contending that the
disclaimer contained in the contract was invalid because it had not been explicitly
negotiated and did not particularly disclaim defects in the frame of the car. Id. at 214-
15, 716 P.2d at 914-15. The court agreed on both counts. Id. at 214, 716 P.2d at 915.
Thus, the seller was left responsible for the merchantability of an attribute that he
apparently intended to disclaim by way of a blanket disclaimer.
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charges a single price for an attribute of a good, even though
the seller's cost of supplying buyers with the attribute varies
among buyers. Thus, the seller charges some buyers more
than the seller must spend to provide them with an attribute
and charges other buyers less than the cost they impose on the
seller. Although the seller is, in the end, correctly compen-
sated for his total cost of providing an attribute to all buyers,
cross-subsidization results in a wealth transfer from buyers
imposing low costs on the seller to those imposing high costs
on the seller. An automobile dealer offering a two-year unlim-
ited mileage warranty against engine breakdowns is a good
example. The seller will calculate his potential warranty liabil-
ity according to the average cost of warranty claims during the
warranty period and will charge a price for the warranty that
equals this average cost. Some buyers, however, will drive
harder or more miles than the average during the warranty
period, while others will drive easier or fewer miles than the
average. If all buyers pay the same price for the warranty,
some will thus be charged more than their use warrants and
others will be charged less. Low-intensity buyers who subject
vehicles to less wear by the manner or extent of their driving
will thereby subsidize high-intensity buyers.
Cross-subsidization occurs in much the same way under
the Berg rules, particularly as it applies to limitations of liabil-
ity for consequential damages. Under Berg, sellers will pass on
to all buyers the average expected cost of warranty suits based
on violations of the Berg rules. Buyers who have knowledge of
the rules, who incur relatively low costs of enforcing a con-
tract, or who have consequential damages high enough to war-
rant a lawsuit, will be able to use the Berg rules to avoid
disclaimers and remedy limitations that are not specifically
negotiated or that do not describe the attributes disclaimed
with particularity. On the other hand, some buyers will be
ignorant of the rules, will have high enforcement costs, or will
have damages too low to warrant suit. These buyers will
therefore be unable to avoid disclaimers even though they are
invalid under the Berg rules. Both sets of buyers, however,
will be charged the same amount by the seller to reimburse
the seller for the cost of suits based on violations of the Berg
rules. Therefore, cross-subsidization will result between buy-
ers who are unable to avoid invalid disclaimers and remedy
limitations and buyers who, through their relatively greater
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ability to pursue a claim, are able to avoid the invalid disclaim-
ers and remedy limitations.
The cross-subsidization resulting from the Berg rules can
be eliminated only by eliminating the rules themselves. If all
disclaimers and remedy limitations were valid regardless of
whether they were explicitly negotiated or whether they set
forth with particularity the attributes disclaimed, all buyers
would be bound by the disclaimer, and cross-subsidization
would be drastically reduced.131
131. In his recent article, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 2193 (1989), Professor Richard Epstein questions the extent, if not
the existence, of the cross-subsidization problem with respect to personal injury
recovery for product failure. As articulated by Priest, supra note 48, at 1351, cross-
subsidization of product purchasers with high incomes or high consequential losses
other than lost income by those with low incomes or low potential consequential losses
will occur when insurance against lost income or other consequential losses is provided
by a product manufacturer via strict liability for product defects. This result will
occur because the manufacturer will have to calculate the premium, which is included
in the product's price, on an average cost basis. The high income or high potential
consequential loss purchaser, whose expected damages will be higher than those of the
low income or low potential consequential loss buyer, will purchase insurance at a
price lower than the cost he imposes and vice versa. Epstein questions one of the
assumptions underlying the argument that low income purchasers will subsidize high
income buyers, namely, that the probabilities of being harmed by a product are the
same for both low and high income product users. Epstein, supra, at 2215. He argues
that so long as some element of uncompensated loss rests upon product users, they will
have some incentive to exercise care against product risks. Product users with higher
incomes or potential consequential losses may suffer greater uncompensated losses and
therefore have an incentive to take greater care in using a product. Id.
Although Epstein's argument is valid in some situations, it is questionable whether
it applies to most situations involving defective products. With respect to any given
product, higher income or potential consequential loss users will take greater care
than lower income users only when the cost of increased care exceeds the value of
such care to members of the latter group. Therefore, it is probable that they will not
take such care. Since markets for a number of goods tend to segment based on
purchasers' income or wealth levels (for example, the automobile market in which
lower income people tend not to buy luxury cars), the spread of income or potential
consequential losses within the purchasing group may be relatively narrow and the
differences in uncompensated losses similarly narrow. If the cost of reducing or
minimizing the risk of harm in a cost-effective manner is less than the expected value
of the loss to buyers at the low end of the income or consequential loss ranges, all
product buyers will expend the same amount on care, the risk of harm occurring will
be minimized in the same amount for all purchasers, and lower income or
consequential loss purchasers will subsidize higher income or consequential loss buyers
through manufacturer provided insurance.
The existence of uncompensated loss as a factor minimizing or eliminating the
problem of cross-subsidization is more problematical when that phenomenon arises
from different intensities in product use. The amount of resources a high intensity
user will expend to reduce the occurrence of product failure will depend upon the
expected value of uncompensated losses and the gains derived from the high degree of
use. For example, a salesman who has purchased a new car and is entitled to a
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V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the economic
unsoundness of the rationales underlying the Berg rules of spe-
cific negotiation and particular disclosure of warranty disclaim-
ers and remedy limitations. Berg is unnecessary to alert
buyers to the terms of the contracts they sign and is inef-
ficiently overinclusive. It causes a deadweight societal loss so
far as it requires all buyers to be so informed, subject to the
caveat that sufficient marginal buyers may be able to discipline
the market as to contract terms by comparing the terms
offered by various sellers. This caveat, however, is not a seri-
ous qualification of our argument. For the reasons discussed
above with respect to the likelihood of marginal buyers know-
ing of the existence of warranty disclaimers, it is highly credi-
ble to assume that those buyers know that warranty
disclaimers exist. That marginal buyers are motivated to shop
for such terms is strongly suggested by the fact that buyers as
a whole perceive that they frequently have cause to complain
about the quality of the products they buy,132 and by extension,
have cause to resort to the warranty covering those products.
Even stronger evidence that marginal buyers consider war-
ranty terms a criterion in comparing sellers is that sellers find
it in their best interests to advertise the quality of their goods
and of the warranties they offer to cover those goods. Such
acts would be inefficient unless sellers could thereby attract
more marginal buyers and thus increase their net income by
increasing their market share.
Furthermore, specific negotiation generally' 3 3 will do
nothing to improve the terms of the contracts into which buy-
ers enter, since individual buyers and sellers are economically
unable to vary the terms of a contract from those demanded by
the market in general. Moreover, mandatory negotiation over
disclaimers of warranties covering low-probability events will
"loaner" from a dealer whenever his car needs warranty work, may have a strong
incentive to "consume" the warranty by driving the automobile as hard as possible
during the warranty converage. Even if he is not entitled to a loaner, the buyer may
find it beneficial to use a car intensively if the cost of obtaining a substitute vehicle
during warranty work is offset by the value of driving the car harder. Increased care
in such a circumstance would not be cost effective to the buyer, his high intensity use
would continue, and subsidization of his use of the vehicle by less intensive users
would continue.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
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do little to increase buyers' welfare. Simply disclosing the fact
that a disclaimer exists and stating with particularity the
attributes as to which the warranty is disclaimed will do noth-
ing to inform the buyer of the probability that the event will
occur. Thus, mandatory negotiation wholly fails to address the
problem of buyers underestimating the probability that a
defect covered by, or excepted from, a warranty will occur.
Also, to the extent that courts have extended Berg to allow
parties with actual knowledge of the terms of contracts they
have signed to avoid those terms on the ground that they were
not explicitly negotiated or explained with particularity, soci-
ety has been made worse off economically, without furthering
any of the policy rationales used by the Berg court to support
its decision.
The Berg rules narrow buyers' choice of contract terms
suboptimally by disabling willing buyers from agreeing to dis-
claimers without incurring additional transaction costs. The
Berg rules are also inefficient to the extent that they create
cross-subsidization among buyers, with all of that phenome-
non's negative economic consequences. Most ironically, the
Berg rules, by virtue of their failure to comprehensively regu-
late the transactions to which they apply, allow sellers to
recover the added costs of complying with the rules by passing
those costs on to buyers through higher prices or attribute deg-
radation. This result leaves buyers with a bundle of attributes
that they desire less than the attribute bundle they would be
provided if the rules were not in effect. This result also
requires them to pay a higher price for that bundle of attrib-
utes. As well intentioned as the Berg court may have been, the
Berg rules fail to help purchasers in the way the court sup-
posed they would; indeed, these rules make purchasers worse
off. Accordingly, the Berg rules should be eliminated. War-
ranty disclaimers generated by a market should be enforced to
the extent they comply with other legal requirements, such as
the disclosure criteria of U.C.C. Section 2-316(2), unless it is
established that a market failure occurred, precluding the pro-
vision of optimal warranty terms in the manner discussed in
this Article.
